Monday, May 18, 2009

List of journal issues I'm considering buying - for reference

1998, 15:1

Connell, George. Deconstructing Caputo's Demythologizing Heidegger (1998, 15:1) 28-40.

*Forrest, Peter. Answers to Prayers and Conditional Situations (1998, 15:1)

*Hasker, William. The Foundations of Theism: Scoring the Quinn-Plantinga Debate (1998, 15:1) 52-67.

Moreland, J. P. Searle's Biological Naturalism and the Argument from Conscience (1998, 15:1) 68-91.

**Murphy, Mark C. Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation (1998, 15:1) 3-27.

*Sudduth, Michael L. Czapkay. Calvin, Plantinga, and the Natural Knowledge of God: A Response to Beversluis (1998, 15:1) 92-103.

1985, 2:3

**Davis, Stephen T. Naturalism and the Resurrection: A Reply to Habermas (1985, 2:3) 303-308.

*Gutting, Gary. The Catholic and the Calvinist: A Dialogue on Faith and Reason (1985, 2:3) 236-256.

*Habermas, Gary R. Knowing That Jesus' Resurrection Occurred: A Response to Davis (1985, 2:3) 295-302.

Jacquette, Dale. Analogical Inference in Hume's Philosophy of Religion (1985, 2:3) 287-294.

Mavrodes, George I. Necessity, Possibility, and the Stone Which Cannot Be Moved (1985, 2:3) 265-271.

*Morriston, Wesley. Is God "Significantly Free"? (1985, 2:3) 257-264.

*Oakes, Robert. Mysticism, Veridicality, and Modality (1985, 2:3) 217-235.

*Robbins, J. Wesley. Does Belief in God Need Proof? (1985, 2:3) 272-286.

1987, 4:3

Adams, Robert M. Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation (1987, 4:3) 262-275.

Goold, Patrick. Kierkegaard's Christian Imperative (1987, 4:3) 304-318.

Hasker, William. The Hardness of the Past: A Reply to Reichenbach (1987, 4:3) 337-342.

**Mar, Gary T. and James G. Hanink. What Euthyphro Couldn't Have Said (1987, 4:3) 241-261.

*Mellema, Gregory. What Is Optional in the Fulfillment of Duty? (1987, 4:3) 282-293.

*Murphy, Jeffrie G. Kantian Autonomy and Divine Commands (1987, 4:3) 276-281.

*Purtill, Richard. Alpha and Beta Virtues and Vices (1987, 4:3) 319-329.

*Zagzebski, Linda. Does Ethics Need God? (1987, 4:3) 294-303.

1990, 7:1

**Davis, Stephen T. Doubting the Resurrection: A Reply to James A. Kellar (1990, 7:1) 99-111.

*Keller, James A. Response to Davis (1990, 7:1) 112-116.

Miller, Barry. Analogy Sans Portrait: God-Talk as Literal but Non-Anthropomorphic (1990, 7:1) 63-84.

Schoen, Edward L. The Sensory Presentation of Divine Infinity (1990, 7:1) 3-18.

*Talbott, Thomas B. The Doctrine of Everlasting Punishment (1990, 7:1) 19-42.

*Wainwright, William. Jonathan Edwards and the Sense of the Heart (1990, 7:1) 43-62.

*Walls, Jerry L. Is Molinism as Bad as Calvinism (1990, 7:1) 85-98.

1995, 12:3

**Cavin, Robert Greg. Is There Sufficient Historical Evidence to Establish the Resurrection of Jesus? (1995, 12:3) 361-379.

Hasker, William. Chrzan on Necessary Gratuitous Evil (1995, 12:3) 423-425.

*Jackson, Timothy P. Is God Just? (1995, 12:3) 393-408.

*Menssen, Sandra and Thomas Sullivan. Must God Create? (1995, 12:3) 321-341.

O'Connor, David. Hasker on Gratuitous Natural Evil (1995, 12:3) 380-392.

Peterson, John. God as Truth (1995, 12:3) 342-360.

Smith, Huston. The Religious Significance of Postmodern (1995, 12:3) 409-422.

2000, 17:1

Brueckner, Anthony. On an Attempt to Demonstrate the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (2000, 17:1) 132-148.

Cooper, John W. Supplemental but not Equal: Reply to Dell'Olio (2000, 17:1) 116-125.

Evans, Stephen C. Kierkegaard on Religious Authority: The Problem of the Criterion (2000, 17:1) 48-67.

*Hasker, William. Anti-Molinism is Undefeated! (2000, 17:1) 126-131.

Kirmmse, Bruce H. The Thunderstorm: Kierkegaard's Ecclesiology (2000, 17:1) 87-102.

McClelland, Richard T. and Robert J. Deltete. Divine Causation (2000, 17:1) 3-25.

Plekton, Michael. Kierkegaard at the End: His 'Last' Sermon, Eschatology and the Attack on the Church (2000, 17:1) 68-86.

**Seymour, Charles. A Craigian Theodicy of Hell (2000, 17:1) 103-115.

Wielenberg, Erik J. Omnipotence Again (2000, 17:1) 26-47.

1986, 3:4

*Kruschwitz, Robert B. Christian Virtues and the Doctrine of the Mean (1986, 3:4) 416-428.

**MacIntyre, Alasdair. Which God Ought We to Obey and Why? (1986, 3:4) 359-371.

**Holmes, Arthur F. Biblical Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy (1986, 3:4) 429-439.

*Meilander, Gilbert. Eritis Sicut Deus: Moral Theory and the Sin of Pride (1986, 3:4) 397-415.

**MsClendon, James W. Narrative Ethics and Christian Ethics (1986, 3:4) 383-396.

**Quinn, Philip L. Christian Atonement and Kantian Justification (1986, 3:4) 440-462.

Van Wyk, Robert N. Autonomy Theses Revisited (1986, 3:4) 372-382.

1991, 8:1

*Basinger, David. Plantinga, Pluralism, and Justified Religious Belief (1991, 8:1) 67-80.

*Brown, Robert F. God's Ability to Will Moral Evil (1991, 8:1) 3-20.

Craig, William Lane. The "Kalam" Cosmological Argument and the Hypothesis of a Quiescent Universe (1991, 8:1) 104-108.

*Herbert, R.T. Is Coming to Believe in God Reasonable or Unreasonable? (1991, 8:1) 36-50.

Nerney, Gayne. Aristotle and Aquinas on Indignation: From Nemesis to Theodicy (1991, 8:1) 81-95.

Pentz, Rebecca. Hick and Saints: Is Saint-Production a Valid Test? (1991, 8:1) 96-103.

Sessions, William Lad. Plantinga's Box (1991, 8:1) 51-66.

Sullivan, Thomas D. Omniscience, Immutability, and The Divine Mode of Knowing (1991, 8:1) 21-35.

1988, 5:4

*Alston, William P. Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God (1988, 5:4) 433-448.

*Basinger, David. Hick's Religious Pluralism and "Reformed Epistemology:" A Middle Ground (1988, 5:4) 421-432.

Griffiths, Paul J. An Apology for Apologetics (1988, 5:4) 399-420.

Hick, John. Religious Pluralism and Salvation (1988, 5:4) 365-377.

Hick, John. A Concluding Comment (1988, 5:4) 449-455.

McKim, Robert. Could God Have More Than One Nature (1988, 5:4) 378-398.

Runzo, William L. God, Commitment, and Other Faiths: Pluralism vs. Relativism (1988, 5:4) 343-364.


Thursday, May 7, 2009

Response to a post on Universalism

I'm a little late to the discussion, but I have some questions that the comments do not seem to address. Just to let you all know, I'm fairly new to the world of philosophy. Right now I'm attending a community college for general studies, but I plan to major in philosophy once I transfer to a university. So, please excuse me if I make a fool of myself.

I'm wondering how justness fits into the discussion. Is not God, for example, all-just? If he is, then (4) should be revised to say: (4') It is no cost to an omnipotent, all-just God to sustain R in existence until tF. (Now maybe an all-just God annihilates those who fail to accept the gospel, in which case God does does not sustain R in existence until tF).

If God is all-just, then could it not be that if God sustains R in existence until tF, then at the time tF, God as all-loving and all-just is committed to both continuing to punish R and reconcile R (assuming for the moment that R's choices warrant R's being eternally punished, in which case R's punishment has not terminated at an earlier time t0, and a deliverance of God's all-goodness is his desiring to reconcile all people)? This would be a sort of conflict of properties: God's all-goodness would contradict his all-justness.

Consider the following analogy. Jim lives in a good but just society. One day Jim ends up killing his friend, Joe, in cold blood (for whatever reason). Jim never repents for his crime and would probably do it again if given the chance. According to the law, the government legitimately sentences Jim to life in prison. However, at a later time t (maybe, say, 20 years into his sentence), Jim finally comes to realize the significance of his actions. He understands what he did was wrong. He earnestly wants to repent and change for the better. Maybe he even becomes a Christian. Now, it would seem that if the society is truly good, then Joe's family should forgive Jim for his mistakes (especially if Jesus' commandments to forgive and turn the other cheek are objectively good commandments), and the government should offer him a second chance and incorporate him back into society. On the other hand, if the government is just, then Jim should not be absolved of his punishment (life in prison). So which should the society do? Keep Jim in prison (since justice demands it)? Or offer Jim a second chance (since prima facie goodness demands it)? I have no idea!

I wonder if predicating the property of "justness" to God presupposes other philosophical theories or views, like retributive justice. How might those presuppositions effect the eternal torment-universalism debate?

Three more things...

First, it seems like the view floating around with most evangelical Christians about hell is really inadequate. Hell went from a place of torment or punishment (created and sustained by God) to a mere separation from God dependent on choice. But how exactly is a separation from God dependent on one's ongoing choice really a punishment? Say Jim asks Joe to go to a party. The party is the talk of the town and by everyone's standard will offer a great time. Joe, however, just isn't interested. He chooses not to go. Instead, he stays home and watches TV. Now maybe nothing is on TV, and Joe ends up having a really lousy, and boring time, and he misses out on the great time he could have had at the party. Or maybe Joe genuinely enjoys his time watching TV: there's a documentary on about Christian philosophers debating about hell. In this case, Joe is happy he chose not to go to the party. Now, presumably if we're comparing Joe to someone that finds himself in hell, then Joe in fact had a bad and boring time staying home watching TV. Now the question is, how exactly is Jim choosing not to go to the party even remotely comparable to a "punishment?" It seems like that if people actually choose to stay in hell, then hell is no punishment at all. I also don't see how separation from God is a punishment, since according to many Christians, atheists are "separate" from God (God does not live in their hearts and so on), but many of them seem quite happy. Look at Joe: he might enjoy missing the party to watch TV.

Second, if Molinism is true (and I understand it correctly), could not God have actualized a world such that all men find themselves in situations where they choose to accept the gospel? If God desires all men to saved (which it seems like an all-good being would surely desire), then wouldn't he actualize such a world? Maybe it's possible that there are some people whose essences are such that no matter what possible world they are instantiated in, they still reject the gospel (presumably even after death). Still, God could have simply chosen not to instantiate those individuals (if he knew they would not be able to choose the gospel and God did not desire that). It might be possible, moreover, that a necessary condition of many people choosing to accept the gospel is God instantiating those individuals (who will never choose to accept the gospel), in which case instantiating those individuals would serve a greater good. In that case, would God desire those individuals to end up in hell, or would he not desire it, but he had no other choice? Nevertheless, wouldn't a God who actualizes a world such that all people eventually choose to accept the gospel or believe in God be "better" than a God who couldn't? So if we're merely dealing with possibility, then shouldn't we, given Molinism, prefer the view that it is the case God actualized such a world (and universalism is true)?

I might completely misunderstand Molinism, of course.

Finally, why is the Christian who accepts libertarian free will committed to holding that God desires/wills all people to believe and be saved? Is this desire a necessary deliverance of God's all-goodness? That is, if God did not desire/will all people to believe and be saved, then would that contradict his all-goodness?

My post ended up a little long. Hopefully my points are coherent.