Blaesi's Blog

Two models of hell

2009-07-04T12:04:00.001-07:00

The idea of a finite creature being punished for an eternity seems to break all of our justice analogies. For example, it's hard to imagine a just judge sentencing a kid who steals a pack of candy to death along with a pedophile rapist, for the two crimes warrant separate punishments. This is why most Christian philosophers have completely abandoned the traditional idea that hell is a place of punishment for what's called the Choice Model. However, I don't see how the Choice Model fits any better with the Bible than does universalism - unless it is combined with a Punishment Model.

Here would be an example of the Choice Model combined with the Punishment Model. A person P commits x amount of sins in his lifetime that warrants y amount of punishment. God punishes P from time t to time t2. At time t2, in his perfect goodness, God offers P the chance to be reconciled. But P being a free agent chooses to reject God, and God respects this choice, which results in P being separated from God. Now one might wonder if God, being perfectly good, would continue to offer reconciliation to P. If this is the case, then God would offer P the chance to be reconciled again at time t3, at which point P would reject God, and so on into eternity. Now one might hold that a well-informed decision to be separate from God amounts to annihilation, in which case God only offers P the chance to be reconciled once. This model does two things. First, it tries to paint a picture of hell that fits with our intuitions of justice. Second, it allows for someone to be lost forever. Of course, universalism is contingently possible given this model, for P could have accepted God at time t2.

There is another option. It could be that sin continues in hell. So, for example, a person P sins x amount in his lifetime which warrants y amount of punishment. God punishes P from time t to time t2, satisfying the amount of punishment y. But at t2, P sins again, warranting further punishment, so God punishes P to t3. But at t3, P sins again, so God punishes him until t4, and on and on into eternity.

Of course, this second model raises numerous questions. For example, is it even possible for someone in hell not to sin, so as to reconciled back to God? If not, it's hard to see how hell is just. Moreover, where does atonement fit into this model? This model seems to paint a works-salvation picture. That is, P remains in hell only because he fails to meet a certain standard. But if we accept a substitution theory of atonement, why isn't P offered the option to accept Jesus as an atonement for his sins? It seems that if God is perfectly loving, the offer of salvation would be on the table, in which case we would be right back to the above Choice Model, whereby one continually rejects God by his own free will.

Both of these models raise serious questions for accounts of providence. For in open theism, the idea that free creatures would eternally reject God seems extremely improbable. In Molinism, of course, it's possible that the counterfactuals of freedom are such that God could actualize a world in which everyone is saved, so to reconcile the above models with Molinism, we would have to hold to transworld damnation (TWD) and refute the objections.

Thoughts on transworld damnation

2009-07-04T12:03:00.000-07:00

Craig's defense of hell seems to rely on the following proposition:

(C) A perfectly good God could choose a world where more people are saved at the cost of some people being damned to a world where all people are saved, even if it is a very small amount.

For example, maybe God has the option between only two feasible worlds, W and W2. In W, everyone is saved, but only 5 people. In W2, in contrast, 1000 people are saved, but 5 are damned. Now the question is whether God, being perfectly good, can choose to actualize W2 over W. Contrary to Craig, it doesn't seem obvious that he can choose to actualize W2 over W. For in actualizing W2, God seems to prefer quantity over quality: it doesn't matter to God that some are getting damned if it gets him a few more people in heaven. Is this really an image of a perfectly good God? I'm not sure. If I had the time, I could probably come up with a good argument by analogy to illuminate this issue. (For example, God choosing W2 over W seems sort of like a business man trading with countries who employ child labor if it means he gets more products.) However, I think there is an easier way to show that (C) is false.

We need to take seriously the idea - expressed in Scripture - that God desires everyone to be saved. Now, if (C) is true, what God truly desires is not that everyone is saved, but that a great amount of people are saved. For if God truly desires everyone to be saved, then he would actualize the world in which everyone is saved. Now there is a powerful objection to this. First, God does not desire anyone to sin, and yet he has clearly actualized a world in which there is sin. Second, if no world were feasible for God in which everyone is saved, we should not expect God to refrain from actualizing any world at all. Now these objections can be met by restating the claim that God desires everyone to be saved with the claim that (1) God desires everyone to be saved (2) God will satisfy this desire as long as it is feasible for him to do so.

Essential Goodness and Freedom

2009-07-04T12:02:00.003-07:00

There seems to be a tension between the essential properties of God and the Free Will Defense. After all, if God is perfectly good, then it seems that there are some states of affairs that God is not free to actualize, but other beings are free to actualize. Take, for example, torturing someone for a thousand years without a reason. While it seems possible for humans to actualize such a state of affairs, it does not seem possible for God to actualize such a state of affairs - for in actualizing such a state of affairs, God would fail to be perfectly good.

But if God, a perfectly good being, cannot actualize states of affairs that are incompatible with perfect goodness, then what is so good about free will? On the one hand, if we say free will is a great good, then we admit that God lacks a great-making property - that is, the ability to actualize states of affairs that are incompatible with perfect goodness. But if we say that God's freedom is better than free will, on the other hand, then it's hard to see how free will justifies the existence of evil, for God had a clearly better option: create essentially good free creatures that never do evil. Thus, there is a dilemma:

(1) Either God is free to actualize states of affairs that are incompatible with perfect goodness or he is not.

(2) If God is free to actualize states of affairs that are incompatible with perfect goodness, then God is not essentially good.

(3) If God is not, then God lacks a great-making property. So:

(4) God is not essentially good, or God lacks a great-making property.

Now one might object to (3) and argue that God's freedom is great. But in this case, (3) can be revised:

(3") If God is not, then free will is not as good as God-freedom and God should have actualized a world in which creatures have God-freedom.

Now one might object to (2) by saying that God never acts in a way that is incompatible with his perfect goodness, but he could if he so willed. But this does not seem to solve the problem. For in saying that God is essentially good, the theist seems to affirm:

(G) God is perfectly good in all possible worlds.

And in saying that God could act contrary to his perfect goodness the objector seems to imply:

(P) There is a possible world in which God behaves in a way that is incompatible with his perfect goodness.

But (G) and (P) are contradictory: they cannot both be true. For if God is perfectly good, then there is no possible world in which he behaves in a way that is incompatible with his perfect goodness; and yet (P) affirms the opposite.

Is there a way to fix this from a Molinist perspective? That is, could it be that God does not behave contrary to his perfect goodness in any possible world, and yet there is a counterfactual of divine freedom that is true, such that if it is true, God could behave contrary to his perfect goodness? For example:

(C) If God were in circumstances C, God would freely torture a rabbit for a thousand years without a reason.

This could be true while at the same time there is no possible world in which God freely tortures a rabbit for a thousand years without a reason. What would the circumstances C be, then? I don't know. Could there be any circumstances under which God would freely torture a rabbit for a thousand years without a reason? (Maybe circumstances in which God is not perfectly good - which seems impossible.) Also, under what type of knowledge would such a counterfactual fall - God's middle knowledge or God's free knowledge? I'm not sure.

An argument against Universalism from atonement

2009-07-04T12:02:00.001-07:00

Many universalists seem to assume two things. On the one hand, Universalists accept

(A) Jesus died as a substitionary atonement.

And, on the other hand, universalists accept

(B) Some people will be punished after death.

Now, given a certain (popular) conception of universalism, (A) and (B) seem to be incompatible. For (A) seems to entail

(A*) People needed salvation from x.

Now, the question is, what is x? Some sort of punishment, presumably. Is the punishment to which x refers the same as the punishment mentioned in (B)? Not obviously. For many universalists seem to distinguish between the punishment people in fact receive and the punishment they would have received had Jesus not died as an atonement. For example, Keith DeRose writes, "Weak exclusivism, then, will be the position that combines the exclusivist thesis that Christ's saving work is necessary for the salvation of any person - so that were it not for Christ, none could be saved ... The scriptural basis for exclusivism is overwhelming." This line of thought seems to entail

(C) If Jesus had not died as an atonement, everyone would have suffered x.

Now this raises the question again, What is x? Whatever it is, everyone has been saved from it by Christ (hence "if not for Christ, none could be saved"). Now this raises a big problem. For (B) above states that some people will be punished. But if Jesus' atonement saves people from what they would have faced, then it must follow that:

(1) Either no one is punished [~(B)] or people are not punished justly (they do not receive what they deserve and would have received).

This means that the universalist must reject (B) above. Thus, universalism emerges as a position that fails to retain any form of retributive justice that is not directed at Jesus as an atonement. But a further objection can be raised. If the above dilemma is not a false dilemma, then it seems that one's accepting Christ during this lifetime is completely irrelevant. For example, consider Jim and Joe. Jim accepts Christ in his lifetime and Joe rejects Christ in his lifetime. If (1) is true, it follows that both Jim and Joe do not receive punishment after death. But then what was the purpose of Jim accepting Christ? Nothing having to do with punishment.

In conclusion, it seems that a traditional understanding of the atonement forces universalism into an undesirable reformulation. However, the universalist might simply water down atonement by interpreting x differently. It could be that x is not what everyone would have suffered, but that x is what some people will in fact suffer. In other words, Jesus' atonement saves people from the (finite) punishment they deserve. In this case, those that accept Jesus as an atonement go straight to heaven, whereas those who do not face their just deserts first. The question is whether or not this conception of atonement is adequate.

An argument for the incompatibility of Defensive prayer and the FWD

2009-07-04T12:01:00.000-07:00

It seems that defensive prayer dealing with demonic activity is incompatible with the Free Will Defense. Many Christians, particularly those that come from Pentecostal leaning backgrounds, believe that demons are active in the world. Demons persecute people both physically and mentally; some people suffer from thorns in the flesh, while others suffer demonic possession. However, prayer can change this. On the one hand, one might pray that God offers protection from demonic activity. On the other hand, one might take part in an exorcism. In either case, there is an implicit tension with the Free Will Defense (FWD).

First, the FWD. The FWD assumes that free will is such a great good that it justifies the existence of moral evil. The FWD can also be used to argue that the only evil that actually exists is moral evil, since natural evil is possibly the activity of free, spiritual agents. In other words, many conceptions of the FWD hold

(D) Demons have free will, and since free will is such a great good, demonic moral evil is justified.

Defensive prayer, in contrast, takes for granted that one's prayer and God's activity can sway demonic activity. For example, one might pray for protection from demonic activity, or pray to be freed from demonic influence or control. In either case, defensive prayer seems to assume implicitly

(P) God can and sometimes does prevent demons from harming humans.

The question is whether or not (D) and (P) are compatible. As of now, (P) and (D) do not directly contradict each other, but there might be a proposition or group of propositions such that if it is added to (P) and (D), it leads to a contradiction. It seems given the FWD, there is such a proposition or group of propositions.

After all, to say that (P) is true seems to presuppose

(P*) God sometimes thwarts the free decisions of demons.

Now (P*) seems incompatible with the free will defense. For if God sometimes thwarts the the free decisions of moral agents, then it was obviously possible for God to create a world W, where

(W) In W, agents have free will, and whenever an agent is going to exercise his free will so as to bring about moral evil, God either (a) prevents the agent from exercising his free will in that way (b) quarantines the consequences of the agent's actions so that no other moral agent suffers a moral evil (c) convinces the agent to act otherwise or (d) prevents the moral evil in some other way, without removing the agent's free will.

Now (W) is clearly better than (P*), so if both were feasible for God and God actualized a world where (P*) is true rather than the world W, then - absent further theodicy - God is not perfectly good. In other words,

(1) Either God actualizes a world where agents have free will and God always respects the free decisions of those agents without interfering, or God does not actualize a world with free will at all.

Given the appeal of a Free Will Theodicy, we'll want to accept the first disjunct:

(1*) In the actual world, God always respects the free decisions of agents without interfering.

Now if (1*) is true, it follows that (P) above is false. For example, (P) seems to entail

(P*) In the actual world, God does not always respect the free decisions of agents without interfering.

But (P*) and (1*) contradict each other.

In conclusion, it seems that the FWD is incompatible with defensive prayer. In other words, if the FWD is true, then prayer cannot and God will not sway the decisions of demons.

List of journal issues I'm considering buying - for reference

2009-05-18T18:36:00.000-07:00

1998, 15:1

Connell, George. Deconstructing Caputo's Demythologizing Heidegger (1998, 15:1) 28-40.

*Forrest, Peter. Answers to Prayers and Conditional Situations (1998, 15:1)

*Hasker, William. The Foundations of Theism: Scoring the Quinn-Plantinga Debate (1998, 15:1) 52-67.

Moreland, J. P. Searle's Biological Naturalism and the Argument from Conscience (1998, 15:1) 68-91.

**Murphy, Mark C. Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation (1998, 15:1) 3-27.

*Sudduth, Michael L. Czapkay. Calvin, Plantinga, and the Natural Knowledge of God: A Response to Beversluis (1998, 15:1) 92-103.

1985, 2:3

**Davis, Stephen T. Naturalism and the Resurrection: A Reply to Habermas (1985, 2:3) 303-308.

*Gutting, Gary. The Catholic and the Calvinist: A Dialogue on Faith and Reason (1985, 2:3) 236-256.

*Habermas, Gary R. Knowing That Jesus' Resurrection Occurred: A Response to Davis (1985, 2:3) 295-302.

Jacquette, Dale. Analogical Inference in Hume's Philosophy of Religion (1985, 2:3) 287-294.

Mavrodes, George I. Necessity, Possibility, and the Stone Which Cannot Be Moved (1985, 2:3) 265-271.

*Morriston, Wesley. Is God "Significantly Free"? (1985, 2:3) 257-264.

*Oakes, Robert. Mysticism, Veridicality, and Modality (1985, 2:3) 217-235.

*Robbins, J. Wesley. Does Belief in God Need Proof? (1985, 2:3) 272-286.

1987, 4:3

Adams, Robert M. Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation (1987, 4:3) 262-275.

Goold, Patrick. Kierkegaard's Christian Imperative (1987, 4:3) 304-318.

Hasker, William. The Hardness of the Past: A Reply to Reichenbach (1987, 4:3) 337-342.

**Mar, Gary T. and James G. Hanink. What Euthyphro Couldn't Have Said (1987, 4:3) 241-261.

*Mellema, Gregory. What Is Optional in the Fulfillment of Duty? (1987, 4:3) 282-293.

*Murphy, Jeffrie G. Kantian Autonomy and Divine Commands (1987, 4:3) 276-281.

*Purtill, Richard. Alpha and Beta Virtues and Vices (1987, 4:3) 319-329.

*Zagzebski, Linda. Does Ethics Need God? (1987, 4:3) 294-303.

1990, 7:1

**Davis, Stephen T. Doubting the Resurrection: A Reply to James A. Kellar (1990, 7:1) 99-111.

*Keller, James A. Response to Davis (1990, 7:1) 112-116.

Miller, Barry. Analogy Sans Portrait: God-Talk as Literal but Non-Anthropomorphic (1990, 7:1) 63-84.

Schoen, Edward L. The Sensory Presentation of Divine Infinity (1990, 7:1) 3-18.

*Talbott, Thomas B. The Doctrine of Everlasting Punishment (1990, 7:1) 19-42.

*Wainwright, William. Jonathan Edwards and the Sense of the Heart (1990, 7:1) 43-62.

*Walls, Jerry L. Is Molinism as Bad as Calvinism (1990, 7:1) 85-98.

1995, 12:3

**Cavin, Robert Greg. Is There Sufficient Historical Evidence to Establish the Resurrection of Jesus? (1995, 12:3) 361-379.

Hasker, William. Chrzan on Necessary Gratuitous Evil (1995, 12:3) 423-425.

*Jackson, Timothy P. Is God Just? (1995, 12:3) 393-408.

*Menssen, Sandra and Thomas Sullivan. Must God Create? (1995, 12:3) 321-341.

O'Connor, David. Hasker on Gratuitous Natural Evil (1995, 12:3) 380-392.

Peterson, John. God as Truth (1995, 12:3) 342-360.

Smith, Huston. The Religious Significance of Postmodern (1995, 12:3) 409-422.

2000, 17:1

Brueckner, Anthony. On an Attempt to Demonstrate the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (2000, 17:1) 132-148.

Cooper, John W. Supplemental but not Equal: Reply to Dell'Olio (2000, 17:1) 116-125.

Evans, Stephen C. Kierkegaard on Religious Authority: The Problem of the Criterion (2000, 17:1) 48-67.

*Hasker, William. Anti-Molinism is Undefeated! (2000, 17:1) 126-131.

Kirmmse, Bruce H. The Thunderstorm: Kierkegaard's Ecclesiology (2000, 17:1) 87-102.

McClelland, Richard T. and Robert J. Deltete. Divine Causation (2000, 17:1) 3-25.

Plekton, Michael. Kierkegaard at the End: His 'Last' Sermon, Eschatology and the Attack on the Church (2000, 17:1) 68-86.

**Seymour, Charles. A Craigian Theodicy of Hell (2000, 17:1) 103-115.

Wielenberg, Erik J. Omnipotence Again (2000, 17:1) 26-47.

1986, 3:4

*Kruschwitz, Robert B. Christian Virtues and the Doctrine of the Mean (1986, 3:4) 416-428.

**MacIntyre, Alasdair. Which God Ought We to Obey and Why? (1986, 3:4) 359-371.

**Holmes, Arthur F. Biblical Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy (1986, 3:4) 429-439.

*Meilander, Gilbert. Eritis Sicut Deus: Moral Theory and the Sin of Pride (1986, 3:4) 397-415.

**MsClendon, James W. Narrative Ethics and Christian Ethics (1986, 3:4) 383-396.

**Quinn, Philip L. Christian Atonement and Kantian Justification (1986, 3:4) 440-462.

Van Wyk, Robert N. Autonomy Theses Revisited (1986, 3:4) 372-382.

1991, 8:1

*Basinger, David. Plantinga, Pluralism, and Justified Religious Belief (1991, 8:1) 67-80.

*Brown, Robert F. God's Ability to Will Moral Evil (1991, 8:1) 3-20.

Craig, William Lane. The "Kalam" Cosmological Argument and the Hypothesis of a Quiescent Universe (1991, 8:1) 104-108.

*Herbert, R.T. Is Coming to Believe in God Reasonable or Unreasonable? (1991, 8:1) 36-50.

Nerney, Gayne. Aristotle and Aquinas on Indignation: From Nemesis to Theodicy (1991, 8:1) 81-95.

Pentz, Rebecca. Hick and Saints: Is Saint-Production a Valid Test? (1991, 8:1) 96-103.

Sessions, William Lad. Plantinga's Box (1991, 8:1) 51-66.

Sullivan, Thomas D. Omniscience, Immutability, and The Divine Mode of Knowing (1991, 8:1) 21-35.

1988, 5:4

*Alston, William P. Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God (1988, 5:4) 433-448.

*Basinger, David. Hick's Religious Pluralism and "Reformed Epistemology:" A Middle Ground (1988, 5:4) 421-432.

Griffiths, Paul J. An Apology for Apologetics (1988, 5:4) 399-420.

Hick, John. Religious Pluralism and Salvation (1988, 5:4) 365-377.

Hick, John. A Concluding Comment (1988, 5:4) 449-455.

McKim, Robert. Could God Have More Than One Nature (1988, 5:4) 378-398.

Runzo, William L. God, Commitment, and Other Faiths: Pluralism vs. Relativism (1988, 5:4) 343-364.

Response to a post on Universalism

2009-05-07T13:27:00.000-07:00

I'm a little late to the discussion, but I have some questions that the comments do not seem to address. Just to let you all know, I'm fairly new to the world of philosophy. Right now I'm attending a community college for general studies, but I plan to major in philosophy once I transfer to a university. So, please excuse me if I make a fool of myself.

I'm wondering how justness fits into the discussion. Is not God, for example, all-just? If he is, then (4) should be revised to say: (4') It is no cost to an omnipotent, all-just God to sustain R in existence until tF. (Now maybe an all-just God annihilates those who fail to accept the gospel, in which case God does does not sustain R in existence until tF).

If God is all-just, then could it not be that if God sustains R in existence until tF, then at the time tF, God as all-loving and all-just is committed to both continuing to punish R and reconcile R (assuming for the moment that R's choices warrant R's being eternally punished, in which case R's punishment has not terminated at an earlier time t0, and a deliverance of God's all-goodness is his desiring to reconcile all people)? This would be a sort of conflict of properties: God's all-goodness would contradict his all-justness.

Consider the following analogy. Jim lives in a good but just society. One day Jim ends up killing his friend, Joe, in cold blood (for whatever reason). Jim never repents for his crime and would probably do it again if given the chance. According to the law, the government legitimately sentences Jim to life in prison. However, at a later time t (maybe, say, 20 years into his sentence), Jim finally comes to realize the significance of his actions. He understands what he did was wrong. He earnestly wants to repent and change for the better. Maybe he even becomes a Christian. Now, it would seem that if the society is truly good, then Joe's family should forgive Jim for his mistakes (especially if Jesus' commandments to forgive and turn the other cheek are objectively good commandments), and the government should offer him a second chance and incorporate him back into society. On the other hand, if the government is just, then Jim should not be absolved of his punishment (life in prison). So which should the society do? Keep Jim in prison (since justice demands it)? Or offer Jim a second chance (since prima facie goodness demands it)? I have no idea!

I wonder if predicating the property of "justness" to God presupposes other philosophical theories or views, like retributive justice. How might those presuppositions effect the eternal torment-universalism debate?

Three more things...

First, it seems like the view floating around with most evangelical Christians about hell is really inadequate. Hell went from a place of torment or punishment (created and sustained by God) to a mere separation from God dependent on choice. But how exactly is a separation from God dependent on one's ongoing choice really a punishment? Say Jim asks Joe to go to a party. The party is the talk of the town and by everyone's standard will offer a great time. Joe, however, just isn't interested. He chooses not to go. Instead, he stays home and watches TV. Now maybe nothing is on TV, and Joe ends up having a really lousy, and boring time, and he misses out on the great time he could have had at the party. Or maybe Joe genuinely enjoys his time watching TV: there's a documentary on about Christian philosophers debating about hell. In this case, Joe is happy he chose not to go to the party. Now, presumably if we're comparing Joe to someone that finds himself in hell, then Joe in fact had a bad and boring time staying home watching TV. Now the question is, how exactly is Jim choosing not to go to the party even remotely comparable to a "punishment?" It seems like that if people actually choose to stay in hell, then hell is no punishment at all. I also don't see how separation from God is a punishment, since according to many Christians, atheists are "separate" from God (God does not live in their hearts and so on), but many of them seem quite happy. Look at Joe: he might enjoy missing the party to watch TV.

Second, if Molinism is true (and I understand it correctly), could not God have actualized a world such that all men find themselves in situations where they choose to accept the gospel? If God desires all men to saved (which it seems like an all-good being would surely desire), then wouldn't he actualize such a world? Maybe it's possible that there are some people whose essences are such that no matter what possible world they are instantiated in, they still reject the gospel (presumably even after death). Still, God could have simply chosen not to instantiate those individuals (if he knew they would not be able to choose the gospel and God did not desire that). It might be possible, moreover, that a necessary condition of many people choosing to accept the gospel is God instantiating those individuals (who will never choose to accept the gospel), in which case instantiating those individuals would serve a greater good. In that case, would God desire those individuals to end up in hell, or would he not desire it, but he had no other choice? Nevertheless, wouldn't a God who actualizes a world such that all people eventually choose to accept the gospel or believe in God be "better" than a God who couldn't? So if we're merely dealing with possibility, then shouldn't we, given Molinism, prefer the view that it is the case God actualized such a world (and universalism is true)?

I might completely misunderstand Molinism, of course.

Finally, why is the Christian who accepts libertarian free will committed to holding that God desires/wills all people to believe and be saved? Is this desire a necessary deliverance of God's all-goodness? That is, if God did not desire/will all people to believe and be saved, then would that contradict his all-goodness?

My post ended up a little long. Hopefully my points are coherent.

Krister Stendahl, 1921-2008

2008-08-16T22:36:00.000-07:00

I have not posted in a while and I doubt many read this blog, but I was motivated to make this post. Hopefully some more posts will follow.

I just discovered tonight that Krister Stendahl, at the age of 86, died on August 15. Though I never met the man and have read little of his work, this had an initial emotional impact on me. First of all, of course, I hate to see the pain death so often brings to a family, even if I’m not there to witness it directly. But for me, Krister’s death embodies the dying of a brilliant generation, and the uncertainties and lack of guidance that await my own. I was first reminded of this when I learned of Bruce Metzger’s death.

Krister Stendahl was a Swedish theologian and New Testament scholar. He was particularly important to the “new perspective on Paul.” I discovered him through his groundbreaking essay “The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West.” Many have described him as caring, kind, and non-judgmental.

I pray that God will bring peace to Stendahl's family, scholars will continue to ponder over his deserving work, and that he will enjoy his rest in anticipation of the salvation and resurrection that awaits us all.

Demythologizing the Gospel and my previous post

2007-11-15T21:50:00.000-08:00

Recently I read an article that addresses many of the issues I raised in my previous post, “A criticism of modern Christianity as I see it”. The article is titled “Demythologizing the Gospel” and is authored by Rance Darity.

Darity begins his essay by quoting Luke 4:18, 19. He explains how the language of the passage has often been construed purely as spiritual, detached from the social implications. The “poor” are viewed purely as the spiritually poor; the “captives” solely as spiritual captives; the “blind” only as the spiritually deceived or ignorant; and the oppressed as merely those afflicted by Satan.

Darity asks, “Doesn't the gospel simply deal with what we hear in church about going to heaven, possessing assurance, and overcoming personal sin?” Darity continues by explaining the dichotomy conservative and liberal Christians sometimes create in interpreting the gospel and asks the important question, “Are we permitted to divide the social and spiritual sides of human existence and limit the concern of the gospel to one dimension only? Is the gospel spiritual, or is it social, or is it holistic?”

Darity sets out to answer his questions and present a “unified gospel that encompasses the spiritual as well as the social.” He continues by pointing out flaws within modern, typical understandings of the gospel that he labels as “myths.” He then presents solutions or alternatives to these myths. Many of them were similar or analogous to the four issues (or myths) I presented in my previous post. Here are the following myths he lists (keep in mind the descriptions are longer in the actual article itself):

“The central concern of the Christian faith is the salvation of individuals from eternal torment. ”
“The spiritual well-being of man is the premier concern of the gospel, and it is possible to water down the message if Christians expend too much effort in causes of social justice and economic development.”
“Since man's body is only physical and destined to perish, the soul of man is the primary concern of the gospel.”
“The Bible contains a simple plan of salvation for the evangelization of sinners. Evangelism is based purely one's ability to share the steps of Christ. Deciding for Christ and praying a sinner's prayer are the only assurance one needs of his conversion to God.”
“The gospel from Genesis to Revelation revolves around the issue of law and grace. The great question facing mankind is how man, the sinner, can find a gracious God. The task of evangelism is mainly to clarify the doctrine of justification by faith. Further, the proper confession of this doctrine is the issue by which the church stands or falls.”

Though the answers are fairly similar to my own (I hope), to see how Darity addresses the above myths, view his article on www.thepaulpage.com.

A criticism of modern Christianity as I perceive it

2007-11-15T02:02:00.000-08:00

This post is not directed at any particular denomination of Christianity, but contemporary Christianity as I see it in my community, which I suppose can be classified as evangelicalism. I decided to make this post because it seems the Christianity I am observing within my community represents the Christianity of most other communities as well and therefore these points are perhaps valid for more than just myself and my own community. There are some things my community over emphasize and some things my community does not emphasize enough. I will point out the things my community stresses too much and then point out the things I believe my community needs to stress more.

1) These Christians place too much of an emphasis on individualism.

Many Christians focus purely on one’s “personal relationship with Jesus.” This itself is not a bad thing, but it is also not the whole story; focusing purely on this individualistic understanding of the gospel ebbs one further away from the Jewish roots of Christianity.

Jesus’ followers where proclaiming the inauguration of the Kingdom of God and Jesus’ Lordship. The good news was not just about how one can have a personal relationship with Jesus, but also of how one can become a part of the Kingdom of God, a renewed, Spirit-filled community. Therefore, the proclamation of the gospel should not alone include how one can enter into a personal relationship with Jesus, but more importantly how one can enter into a renewed, Spirit-filled community, which as a whole is in a personal relationship with God.

The more the church concentrates on individualism, the further it moves away from the Jewish roots of Christianity, and the closer it comes to Gnosticism.

2) These Christians place too much of an emphasis on the phrase “born again.”

The phrase has become so banal among most Christians that its true meaning has almost been lost. Little realize this phrase is only mentioned in one of the gospels, the latest and most individualistic of them all, though the concept appears everywhere else. The phrase “born again,” I would argue, is bound up with water baptism, which calls not only for repentance, but foreshadows resurrection, implying a Spirit-energized change of life style.

3) Dispensationalism has become a standard eschatology for these Christians.

The imminent return of Jesus is stressed so much that the present physical, social and political needs of the world and its inhabitants are completely ignored. People are worried about how to escape the world, rather than how to bring God’s justice to the world as a foreshadow for what God himself will bring to the world (i.e. New Jerusalem). This message downplays resurrection and the promise for the renewal of creation and provides Christians with an excuse to not worry about, for example, helping the poor and getting involved with wider global issues (e.g. “Why help the world if we are leaving it in the rapture?”). Additionally, this view (e.g. premillenialism) downplays the significance of what Jesus and his followers did 2000 years ago.

4) These Christians accept the Bible as inerrant a priori.

While I do not have any problems in particular with the belief that the Bible is inerrant, though I may disagree with that view, this almost a priori acceptance makes it appear as if thinking otherwise places one outside Christianity, and also displays ignorance to and scares one from becoming familiar with textual criticism. Many remain ignorant to the importance of translation, some find themselves jumping through hoops, and distorting the texts along the way, to avoid contradictions, and others find themselves swayed of their faith when the possibility that the Bible is not inerrant begins to make sense.

The above are four things in particular within my community I believe need revision. Bellow I have compiled a list of the things I believe need more emphasis to return my community to its first century, Jewish roots.

1) We need to have a stronger emphasis on the Kingdom of God as a present, renewed, Spirit-filled community.

The proclamation evangelists should make is that Jesus rose from the dead and is therefore the crowned Messiah and Lord of the whole world, namely this very Kingdom of God community. The good news is that Jesus’ blood not only usurped in the forgiveness of sins (especially for Jesus’ people, Israel), but also broke down the walls that once separated the Gentiles from the Jews and their covenant with God. One can become a part of this community through repentance and open acknowledgment of Jesus’ Lordship, symbolically expressed through water baptism, thereby gaining a personal relationship with God and his son Jesus. Individualism should spring from an emphasis on covenant nationalism and citizenship.

2) The evangelist needs to address social, economic, and cultural issues.

Evangelism needs to be thought of less as the way by which the church saves the people of the outside world from “hell” so they can “go to Heaven when they die” and be thought of more of the way by which the church proclaims the good news (not bad news, e.g., “You're going to hell!”) of Jesus’ Lordship, the arrival of the Kingdom of God as a Spirit-filled community, and the calling of servants to bring God’s loving justice to the rest of creation. There should be a strong emphasis on helping people with their physical needs in addition to their spiritual needs. As the author of the epistle of James said, “If a brother or sister is poorly clothed and lacking in daily food, and one of you says to them, ‘Go in peace, be warmed and filled [e.g. “be born again”], without giving them the things needed for the body, what good is that?” (Jas 2:15).

3) Resurrection needs to dominate or replace life after death.

As apposed to stressing life after death and the Platonic language that describes it, there should be a huge emphasis on resurrection and the renewal of creation. The Christian experience, especially baptism, implies God is redoing creation from the bottom up and will one day complete this process through the bodily resurrection of his people. The proclamation should not be about “I’m going to Heaven when I die” but “God will redeem and resurrect my mortal body through a great act of renewal.”

4) Water baptism should be taken less lightly and have its significance explained.

Baptism should be reinstituted over or at least combined with the so-called “sinner’s prayer” as a public declaration of repentance but also of a reminder of Jesus’ resurrection, a foreshadow of the renewal of creation, and a motivation for the carrying out of a new, Spirit-energized life style. The newly initiated Christian should understand that faith brings good works and fellowship. The “sinner’s prayer” leaves one guessing; baptism symbolizes the full Christian experience (death to self, resurrection to the newness of Spirit, and so on). On another note, the evangelist must remember acknowledging Jesus' Lordship is not limited to a preconstructed and banal prayer that sometimes leaves the convert guessing as to what being a Christian really means.

5) Dispensationalism should be excluded from the church and left for each individual to decide on.

There should be less talk about “Jesus is returning soon to rapture me out of this failing creation!” and more of an acknowledgeable that God called his creation good and that the church has a duty to deliver God’s love and justice to the rest of the world. Resurrection should not be foreshadowed in baptism alone, but also in our actions. God will one day renew the Earth and we must be a precursor to it. There, moreover, needs to be a stronger sense of the Biblical narratives. Stories, such as the Exodus, and the Acts of the Apostles, need to be retold, and related (by, for example, analogy) to the present, rather than taken to specifically refer to the present or the concrete future.

6) Though the Bible should remain authoritative, it should be viewed more historically.

Rather than viewed as strictly as the word of God, the Bible should be viewed as the record of God’s interactions with humanity. Some of these humans were inspired by God to proclaim God’s message to the rest of humanity, so in that sense, the Bible is also inspired. Inerrancy should be avoided, because it sometimes creates more problems than it fixes.

I will add to and revise the above points as I continue to observe and consider Christianity in my modern, American community. My opinion may change as I grow as a Christian, but this is how I see it in the present.

Some brief thoughts on the reign of Christ and premillennialism

2007-11-15T01:36:00.000-08:00

I think there is a difference between Christ’s present reign (his receiving of his Kingdom from the Ancient of Days upon ascent and our sharing in his reign in the here-and-now) and the future renewal of creation (i.e. the full, complete coming of the Kingdom of God). We must differentiate between the two. Christ’s reign is progressive (as in Mark 4:31, the Kingdom of God is compared with a grain of mustard seed, which, when sown on the ground, is the smallest of all the seeds on earth, but progressively grows up and becomes larger than all the garden plants): he ascends to the right hand of God and reigns in the midst of his enemies (Psa 110:1–2; cf. 1Co 15:25–26). The final enemy to be defeated is death, and when death is defeated, God’s Kingdom will be complete and set up on a renewed Earth where enemies no longer exist. I do not see how this view, however, fits in with premillennialism.

Premillennialism, in my opinion, turns Jesus into the revolutionary, Roman-slaying Messiah the first century Jews expected but did not see, rather than the historical Jesus who defeated the forces of evil that work behind earthly enemies, including Rome, establishing a Kingdom on Earth not by physical, military revolution, but by the establishment of a community – a renewed Israel – in the formation of a New Covenant (which itself is a foreshadow of the renewal of creation), by the calling of the Gentiles, and especially the sending of the Spirit, but also in the proclamation of God’s justice and love, the institution of God’s judgment on rebellious Jerusalem through the Romans (something completely unexpected by first century Jews), and finally the defeat of the early church’s most fiercest of enemies, Rome, through its conversion to Christianity (on this point, cf. Andrew Perriman). I think we must either place the 1000-year reign of Revelation in the context of the establishment of a renewed Spirit-filled community, the church, especially in relation to the conversion of Rome to the religion it once persecuted, or admit John’s vision does not correspond with the other texts (which, perhaps, is much easier).

Life After Death and the Intermediate State in the Bible

2007-11-15T00:36:00.000-08:00

Introduction

I have wanted to make this post, among others, for a while. However, I wanted it to be pretty in-depth, and I didn’t find the energy to make it until now. The subject is the intermediate state. The question is, does the believer consciously exist after death? If so, does the unbeliever consciously exist after death? If so to one or both, was this the case for all humans before Jesus?

Throughout the last two years of my studies, one doctrine I have always felt the most strongly about is one that is commonly called “soul sleep.” What I believed (and perhaps still believe) is that upon death both the believer and unbeliever enter an intermediate state of unconsciousness, or more specifically, nonexistence. I define this state, perhaps properly, as Sheol/Hades/grave. This state of unconsciousness is reversed at resurrection. Though from a living perspective the dead are unconscious, theoretically the gap between death and resurrection appears void to one who dies. From the perspective of one who dies, the next conscious experience he has is resurrection; from this comes the metaphor of sleep, a dreamless sleep.

I have recently decided to explore this belief more objectively. Can it really be strongly substantiated? Substantiated or not, it certainly puts a strong emphasis on resurrection and new creation, two things most who concentrate purely on going to Heaven at death completely forget about. I think it is positive in those respects.

N.T. Wright goes over this subject in The resurrection of the Son of God and provides evidence that most first century Jews (cf. Wisdom of Solomon) believed in both a conscious intermediate state and a resurrection. He also provides marginal evidence that this is what the authors (namely Paul) of the New Testament believed. But this does not seem, in my opinion, to align with what the canonical Hebrew Scriptures have to say. The beliefs seem to have sprung up with Hellenism.

This post turned out pretty long, but try to bear with me. The translation used throughout is the ESV unless otherwise stated.

Immortality of the Soul

I think the view that the soul is immortal needs to be completely stamped out. Even N.T. Wright seems to deny the immortality of the soul, suggesting such beliefs came about as a result of Platoism (cf. “Neither is the Final Destination”). The Jewish Encyclopedia comments, “Only through the contact of the Jews with Persian and Greek thought did the idea of a disembodied soul, having its own individuality, take root in Judaism” (“Soul”). This view seems to be pretty well substantiated.

The first mention of the soul (nephesh) appears in the opening chapters of Genesis. There are two steps to the creation of man, namely, the soul.

[1] the LORD God formed the man of dust from the ground

[2] and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life,

[=] and the man became a living creature [nephesh] (Gen 2:7).

Here, the soul seems to be the combination of body and spirit. This pretty much rules out the possibility of the soul surviving death, because death is defined almost precisely as the result of separation of body and spirit elsewhere (Ecc 12:7; Psa 104:29, 146:4). If the soul is the result of the body and spirit being combined, it will naturally cease to exist when the body and spirit are separated.

On the other hand, nephesh seems to take on other meanings elsewhere. It comes to represent not only man himself, but also the vitality of man.

“For the life [nephesh] of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it for you on the altar to make atonement for your souls [nephesh], for it is the blood that makes atonement by the life [nephesh] … For the life [nephesh] of every creature is its blood: its blood is its life [nephesh]. Therefore I have said to the people of Israel, You shall not eat the blood of any creature, for the life [nephesh] of every creature is its blood. Whoever eats it shall be cut off” (Lev 17:11, 14).

“Only be sure that you do not eat the blood, for the blood is the life [nephesh], and you shall not eat the life [nephesh] with the flesh” (Deu 12:23).

The Jewish Encyclopedia explains:

“The belief that the soul continues its existence after the dissolution of the body is a matter of philosophical or theological speculation rather than of simple faith, and is accordingly nowhere expressly taught in Holy Scripture. As long as the soul was conceived to be merely a breath (“nefesh”; “neshamah”; comp. “anima”), and inseparably connected, if not identified, with the life-blood (Gen. ix. 4, comp. iv. 11; Lev. xvii. 11; see Soul), no real substance could be ascribed to it (Jewish Encyclopedia, “immortality of the soul”).

Still, the soul seems largely connected with, associated with, and even identified as the physical (conscious) human body (or person), as seen by its affiliation with the blood. It definitely does not seem to be conceived of as immortal. Other Scriptures elucidate this point.

“Behold, all souls are mine; the soul of the father as well as the soul of the son is mine: the soul who sins shall die. … The soul who sins shall die” (Eze 18:4, 20).

Here, the soul is thought of as dying along with the body.

The ruach, on the other hand, when used to describe a component of man (in contrast to its figurative use to describe the heart, mind, or inner-self of man) is certainly not thought of as conscious. N.T. Wright comments on the spirit returning to God, “Death means that the body returns to the dust, and the breath to God who gave it; meaning not that an immortal part of the person goes to live with God, but that the God who breathed life’s breath into human nostrils in the first place will simply withdraw it into his own possession” (RSG, Wright 98–99). The Jewish Enyclopedia agrees, “As soon as the spirit or breath of God (“nishmat” or “ruaḥ ḥayyim”), which was believed to keep body and soul together, both in man and in beast (Gen. ii. 7, vi. 17, vii. 22; Job xxvii. 3), is taken away (Ps. cxlvi. 4) or returns to God (Eccl. xii. 7; Job xxxiv. 14), the soul goes down to Sheol or Hades, there to lead a shadowy existence without life and consciousness (Job xiv. 21; Ps. vi. 6 [A. V. 5], cxv. 17; Isa. xxxviii. 18; Eccl. ix. 5, 10)” (Jewish Encyclopedia, “immortality of the soul”).

Genesis discounts the immortality of man in general.

“And the LORD God commanded the man, saying, “You may surely eat of every tree of the garden, but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die” (Gen 2:16–17).

“[After Adam and Eve sin, God declares] Behold, the man has become like one of us in knowing good and evil. Now, lest he reach out his hand and take also of the tree of life and eat, and live forever—therefore the LORD God sent him out from the garden of Eden to work the ground from which he was taken” (Gen 3:22–23).

God makes it clear that Adam's mortality is sealed if he sins. After he sins, God sends him away from the tree of life and denies him immortality. This fits in with what Paul says, “the King of kings … alone has immortality” (1Ti 6:15b–16a).

The Old Testament and Sheol

It appears most of the authors of the Hebrew Scriptures believed man goes to a place (or state) called sheol at death.

“All his sons and all his daughters rose up to comfort him, but he refused to be comforted and said, ‘No, I shall go down to Sheol to my son, mourning.’ Thus his father wept for him” (Gen 37:35).

Sheol is almost synonymous with death and the dust of the Earth (cf. Paul’s translation of hades as thanatos in the critical text of 1Co 15:55 with Hos 13:14 LXX; Psa 30:9); Andrew agrees and comments, “Numerous texts in the Greek Old Testament place ‘Hades,’ which is equivalent to the Hebrew ‘Sheol,’ in synonymous parallelism with ‘death’” (COSM, Perriman 94). In sheol, there is no distinction between the righteous and unrighteous, rich and poor, high class and low class, and man and beast; all go to the same place (1Sa 2:6; Psa 89:48; Ecc 9:2–3). There is no profit in death (Psa 30:9a) for the dead do not praise, remember, or hope for God in sheol (Psa 6:5, 30:9, 88:11, 115:17; Isa 38:18), but are cut off from his presence, though God’s omnipresence ensures his existence even in sheol (Psa 139:8). Rather, the inhabitants of sheol are described as shades (Isa 14:9, 26:14).

The best description of sheol comes from Solomon.

“For the living know that they will die, but the dead know nothing, and they have no more reward, for the memory of them is forgotten. Their love and their hate and their envy have already perished, and forever they have no more share in all that is done under the sun. … Whatever your hand finds to do, do it with your might, for there is no work or thought or knowledge or wisdom in Sheol, to which you are going” (Ecc 9:Ecc 9:5-6, 10).

According to Solomon, the dead know nothing. There is no work, thought, knowledge, or wisdom in sheol. In other words, death yields little more than unconsciousness.

Despite sheol often translated “hell” in the KJV, it is not thought of as a place of torment (though being sent to sheol is sometimes counted as a punishment).
Andrew explains concerning hades, the Greek translation of sheol:

“Hades is not a place of torment. Rather than eat the flesh of an unlawful sacrifice, the righteous scribe Eleazar tells Antiochus’ officials to ‘send him to Hades’ (2 Macc. 6:23), clearly not expecting to suffer punishment there” (COSM, Perriman 94–95).

Sheol is often described as being deep in the Earth (Num 16:33; Deu 32:22; Isa 7:11, cf. 57:9; Eze 31:14; Psa 86:13). The Jewish Encyclopedia provides an explanation for the origins of sheol based on its descriptions:

“The question arises whether the Biblical concept is borrowed from the Assyrians or is an independent development from elements common to both and found in many primitive religions. Though most of the passages in which mention is made of Sheol or its synonyms are of exilic or post-exilic times, the latter view, according to which the Biblical concept of Sheol represents an independent evolution, is the more probable. It reverts to primitive animistic conceits. With the body in the grave remains connected the soul (as in dreams): the dead buried in family graves continue to have communion (comp. Jer. xxxi. 15). Sheol is practically a family grave on a large scale. Graves were protected by gates and bolts; therefore Sheol was likewise similarly guarded. The separate compartments are devised for the separate clans, septs, and families, national and blood distinctions continuing in effect after death. That Sheol is described as subterranean is but an application of the custom of hewing out of the rocks passages, leading downward, for burial purposes” (“Sheol”).

Thus, it appears the concept of sheol has its origins in traditional Hebrew burial practices. In this way, the soul is thought of dying and entering the grave with the body; and at least from Solomon’s perspective, there is no consciousness beyond the grave.

The Return of Death

God tells Adam after he sins:

“By the sweat of your face you shall eat bread, till you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; for you are dust, and to dust you shall return” (Gen 3:19).

Here, death is a return to the dust of the Earth. Solomon picks up on this theme also, elaborating that the spirit also returns to God (Ecc 12:7). However, there are two verses in particular that take an interesting twist on the theme of the return of death.

“For I know that, unto death, thou wilt bring me back [shub], even unto the house of meeting for every one living” (Job 30:23, Rotherham).

“The wicked shall return [shub] to Sheol, all the nations that forget God” (Psa 9:17).

Here, those who are soon to die are thought of as returning to death and sheol. Of course, shub in these two instances may not denote a return to a starting point. Perhaps someone can discuss this issue further. However, if man does returns to the state he exists in before his birth (in Adam’s case dust; in everyone else’s cases, depending on how you think shub should be translated, sheol and death), there is little reason to think he enters a state of consciousness.

An Old Testament Alternative

One concept that initially seems to offer an alternative to sheol appears early on in the Hebrew Scriptures.

“Abraham breathed his last and died in a good old age, an old man and full of years, and was gathered to his people” (Gen 25:8).

This does not necessarily mean Abraham entered a state of conscious existence after his death, but that he went to the same place (or entered the same state) as his relatives, sheol, to sleep with his fathers (e.g. 1Ki 2:10). However, this sees to be bound up also with Hebrew burial traditions. The next two verses read:

“Isaac and Ishmael his sons buried him in the cave of Machpelah, in the field of Ephron the son of Zohar the Hittite, east of Mamre, the field that Abraham purchased from the Hittites. There Abraham was buried, with Sarah his wife” (Gen 25:9–10).

This comes up again when burial and the gathering of a dead man to his people are almost explicitly bound up in the transportation of the corpse to his native land, to dwell in a cemetery with his dead relatives.

“And when the time drew near that Israel must die, he called his son Joseph and said to him, ‘If now I have found favor in your sight, put your hand under my thigh and promise to deal kindly and truly with me. Do not bury me in Egypt, but let me lie with my fathers. Carry me out of Egypt and bury me in their burying place.’ He answered, ‘I will do as you have said’” (Gen 47:29–30).

N.T. Wright notes some ambiguous Old Testament alternatives to sheol in The Resurrection of the Son of God.

“There are some passages which appear, at least on one reading, to offer hope that YHWH will deliver people from Sheol. The problem with these passages is to know whether this refers to a deliverance that lies beyond Sheol – i.e. that YHWH will snatch the dead person out of Sheol, either taking them, after death, to some other, more attractive, post-mortem existence, or rescuing them after a short stay – or whether it simply refers to deliverance from death, i.e. prolonging life to a good old age rather than being cut off in one’s prime” (Wright 103–104).

These passages do pose a problem. How can or should we interpret these passages? Could these not be subtle allusions to resurrection? N.T. Wright gives a few examples and provides his opinion. He first explains, “The best-known of these passages is Psalm 16 [v. 8–11]” (Wright 104):

“I have kept YHWH before me; because he is at my right hand, I shall not be moved. Therefore my heart is glad, and my soul rejoices; my body also rests secure. For you do not give me up to Sheol, or let your faithful one see the Pit. You show me the path of life; in your presence there is fullness of joy; in your right hand are pleasures for evermore.”

Based on the passages, even within the Psalms themselves, declaring Sheol’s inhabitant’s inability to praise the Lord, I think the most likely interpretation of these passages is that the Psalmist was experiencing a time of prosperity, praising the Lord in his own lifetime. Wright comments:

“There is legitimate doubt over whether this refers to escaping death or passing through it to a life beyond, but there is no question of the basis of the hope. It is YHWH himself; the one the Psalmist embraces as his sovereign one (verse 2), his portion and cup (verse 5), the one who gives him counsel in the secret places of his heart (verse 7).

This question can be raised in connection with Psalm 22. The Psalmist is clearly in deep trouble, physical danger, and distress: ‘you lay me’, he says,‘in the dust of death’ (verse 15). Nevertheless, he prays that God will save his life, and, in a famous reversal of fortunes, the closing verses of the Psalm gives thanks that God has done just that (verses 22–31). As a part of this thanksgiving, the Psalm celebrates the fact that everyone will eventually submit to God, even the dead:

To him shall all the proud of the earth bow down; before him shall bow all who go down to the dust, and he who cannot keep himself alive [Ps. 22.29].

The main hope, though, seems to be that of rescue from violent death, rather than a deliverance the other side of the grave. The Psalm ends with a reaffirmation of the traditional hope of Israel, for the coming ‘seed’ who will give God thanks (verses 30-31). This affirmation of continuing life, rather than of resurrection itself, is presumably what is intended by Psalm 104 as well” (Wright 104).

It seems Wright agrees with me. But there are other examples he touches.

“Something more definite can be said about Psalm 73 at least. One of the classical biblical complaints about the apparent injustices of life (the wicked and arrogant always seem to get away with it), this Psalm takes its place alongside the book of Job itself. It offers, though, a different sort of answer. For a start, when the Psalmist goes into God’s sanctuary, he realizes that the wicked will indeed be condemned, though how and when this will happen remains unclear:

Truly you set them in slippery places; you make them fall to ruin. How they are destroyed in a moment, swept away utterly by terrors! They are like a dream when one awakes; on awaking you despite their phantoms [Ps. 73.18-20]” (Wright 106).

Is this perhaps the proclamation that the wicked enter postmortem conscious distress? Or is this the expressing the hope the wicked will be judged after resurrection? Or perhaps even more simply, is the Psalmist saying the wicked get what is coming to them in their own lifetime, as earlier Hebrew traditions claimed?

This not all to the Psalm, however. The Psalmist continues:

“Nevertheless I am continually with you; hold my right hand. You guide me with your counsel, and afterward you will receive me to glory. Whom have I in heaven but you? And there is nothing on Earth that I desire other than you. My flesh and my heart may fail, but God is the strength of my heart and my portion for ever … For me it is good to be near God; I have made the Lord YHWH my refuge, to tell you of all your works [(Psalm Ps. 73.23–7)]” (qtd. in Wright 106).

N.T. Wright notes the word for “receive” in v. 24 could be translated “take” as it is in Genesis 5:24. He comments further:

“It seems clear that ‘and afterward’ (weachar) in verse 24 refers, not to an event that will take place later on within the present life, but to a state which will obtain after the present life of being guided by God’s counsel. This is confirmed by verse 26, where, with echoes of Isaiah 40:6-8, human frailty and even death are met by the unshakeable strength of God himself. Unfortunately the crucial word kabod, translated here as ‘to glory’ – crucial because it would be good to know what exactly the Psalmist thought lay ahead – could equally well be translated, with NRSV, as ‘with honor’” (Wright 106).

Does this verse, on the fridge of many others that suggest the opposite, really support a doctrine of a conscious intermediate state? Could this not equally refer to resurrection or something simpler?

Wright points out one last verse where the same Hebrew word for “receive” as in the previous is used.

In this passage, after the Psalmist declares humans are no better than beasts, all going to the grave, he seems to offer an alternative to his own fate.

“Like sheep they are appointed for Sheol; Death shall be their shepherd; straight to the grave they descend, and their form shall waste away; Sheol shall be their home. But God will ransom my soul from the power of Sheol, for he will receive me” (qtd. in Wright 107).

Could this not also display hope for resurrection? The above passages remind me of the Psalmist’s hope that “will not abandon [his] soul to Sheol, or let [the] holy one see corruption” (Psa 16:10).

These verses appear to offer an alternative to sheol, but I leave it to the reader to decide what exactly they mean and whether they harmonize with the descriptions of the unconsciousness of sheol. No matter how you interpret them, the fact remains: the hope for life after death is extremely marginal in the Old Testament.

The New Testament and Hades

Hades, the Greek equivalent to the Hebrew sheol, is used only nine times in the New Testament. Three verses, however, are of particular interest. The first appears in the book of Acts, chapter two.

It is the day of Pentecost. The Apostles are anointed with flaming tongues and begin to speak in other languages. Some think they are drunk, so Peter stands up proclaiming the gospel.

“Men of Israel, hear these words: Jesus of Nazareth, a man attested to you by God with mighty works and wonders and signs that God did through him in your midst, as you yourselves know—this Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men. God raised him up, loosing the pangs of death, because it was not possible for him to be held by it. For David says concerning him, ‘I saw the Lord always before me, for he is at my right hand that I may not be shaken; therefore my heart was glad, and my tongue rejoiced; my flesh also will dwell in hope. For you will not abandon my soul to Hades, or let your Holy One see corruption. You have made known to me the paths of life; you will make me full of gladness with your presence’” (Act 2:22–28).

Here is where the interesting twist comes:

“Brothers, I may say to you with confidence about the patriarch David that he both died and was buried, and his tomb is with us to this day. Being therefore a prophet, and knowing that God had sworn with an oath to him that he would set one of his descendants on his throne, he foresaw and spoke about the resurrection of the Christ, that he was not abandoned to Hades, nor did his flesh see corruption. This Jesus God raised up, and of that we all are witnesses. Being therefore exalted at the right hand of God, and having received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, he has poured out this that you yourselves are seeing and hearing. For David did not ascend into the heavens, but he himself says, ‘The Lord said to my Lord, Sit at my right hand, until I make your enemies your footstool.’” (Act 2:29–35).

Peter reinterprets David’s Psalm and says he was not speaking of his own fate, but of Jesus’. David was left in Hades; Jesus was not. David is still buried; Jesus is not. David did not ascend to Heaven; Jesus did.

The next passages of interest appear in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter fifteen.

“Behold! I tell you a mystery. We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we shall be changed. For this perishable body must put on the imperishable, and this mortal body must put on immortality. When the perishable puts on the imperishable, and the mortal puts on immortality, then shall come to pass the saying that is written: ‘Death is swallowed up in victory.’ ‘O death, where is your victory? O death, where is your sting?’” (1Co 15:51–55).

While most critical texts read thanatos twice in verse fifty-five, the Textus Receptus reads hades the second time. The fact remains, however, the Masoretic Text reads sheol and the Septuagint hades. Paul interprets this prophecy in the context of resurrection. The implications of Paul quoting this passage is that Paul sees hades as having power even over the believer and as not defeated until after resurrection. This fits in with John’s Apocalypse when hades gives up its dead (Rev 20:13), only to be destroyed in the lake of fire after judgment (v. 14).

The last passage of interest appears in the parable of Lazarus and the rich man. In the parable, the rich man fares prosperous while Lazarus is poor and ailed. However, there is a reversal of fortune when the two die. Lazarus enters the comfort of Abraham’s bosom whereas the rich man goes to Hades.

“[In] Hades, being in torment, he [the rich man] lifted up his eyes and saw Abraham far off and Lazarus at his side” (Luk 16:23).

This hades seems like the antithesis of the Hades of the Hebrew Scriptures. In fact, it has been noted to have much in common with the Hades of Greco-Roman tradition. On the other hand, both Andrew and Wright have their doubts about what this verse reflects about actual life after death.

D.B. Gowler notes:

“Some scholars have suggested that the Parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19–31) derives from an Egyptian folktale about the journey of Setme Chamois (led by his son Si-osire) through the realm of the dead. They believe Jesus adapted this Egyptian story for his own purposes and created the second half of the parable (16:27–31).

A closer examination of the evidence, however, calls for a broader, Greco-Roman comparative framework for reading the parable. Ronald Hock, for example, provides an apt comparison from the Lucian texts, Gallus and Cataplus, where a poor, marginalized artisan named Micyllus goes hungry from early morning to evening and must bear the slights, insults, and beatings of the powerful. When Micyllus and a rich tyrant named Megapenthes die, they both make the trip to Hades.

Megapenthes, like the rich man in Jesus’ parable, tries to strike a bargain to alter his situation, but to no avail. Finally, Micyllus and Megapenthes face Rhadamanthus, the judge of the underworld. Micyllus is judged to be pure and goes to the Isle of the Blessed. Megapenthes’s soul, however, is stained with corruption, and he will be appropriately punished. In Hock’s opinion, both this story and the Parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus betray the ancient Cynic philosophers’ views on the problems with wealth and the virtues of poverty” (“The Contexts of Jesus’ Parables”, Gowler 16–17).

Andrew Perriman points out in The Coming of the Son of Man:

“The exception [to Hades being a place of torment] … is Jesus’ story about the rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19–23), which deserves careful consideration. Ostensibly this rather curious parable, which appears to have some affinity with an Egyptian folktale known in the first century [see Nolland, Luke, 557], is about the failure of the wealthy to act justly towards the poor: it is naturally read as an attack on the Pharisees who were ‘lovers of money’ (16:14). More often, though, it has been a bone of contention in the debate over the nature of hell: R. A. Peterson, for example, draws the conclusion that this parable teaches that the wicked will enter an ‘intermediate state after death’ in which they will ‘endure torment and agony.’ Certain observations, however, suggest that this sort of interpretation entirely misses the point of the story.

First, the image of one who must eat what falls from the table (as Lazarus does from the rich man’s table) is used by the Syrophoenician woman to justify her boldness when she begs Jesus to cast a demon out of her daughter (Mark 7:28; cf. Matt. 15:27). It is likely that we are meant to view Lazarus in the same light, as one who is not merely wretchedly poor but spiritually disenfranchised. Lazarus is a Jewish name, and apart from this intertextual echo there is no reason to think that he represents the Gentiles [on this see bellow] who will come into the kingdom in place of the leaders of the people. He corresponds to the ‘poor and crippled and blind and lame’ who are brought in from the streets and lanes of the city in Jesus’ parable of the great banquet not those beyond the walls of the city who are compelled to come in later (Luke 14:16–24). …

[Also], while the rich man’s five brothers could certainly have found in Moses and the prophets exhortations to act justly and defend the poor, they would also have found that such statements were embedded in eschatological contexts. The point was not that social and economic injustice were morally wrong, but that if Israel did not repent of its sin, including injustice towards the poor, the nation would come under judgment. …

This leads us towards the conclusion that the Hades in which the rich man is tormented is not the conventional Hades of the Old Testament, which, as we have seen, is not a place of punishment. Nor is it the traditional ‘hell’ of popular Christian belief. Rather it is an image of the destruction that would come upon the ‘wealthy’ in Israel, who despite the riches and glories of their religious heritage failed to understand that, in the words of the beatitude, the kingdom of God would be given to the poor (cf. Luke 6:20)” (Perriman 96–97).

Wright mostly agrees:

“I stressed in the earlier volume that the parable of the rich man and Lazarus is to be treated precisely as a parable, not as a literal description of the afterlife and its possibilities. It is therefore inappropriate to use it as prima facie evidence for Jesus’ own sketching (or Luke’s portrait of Jesus’ sketching) of a standard post-mortem scenario. It is, rather, an adaption of a well-known folk-tale, projecting the rich/poor divide of the present on to the future in order to highlight the present responsibility, and culpability, of the careless rich. However, while the parabolic nature of the story prevents us from treating it as Jesus’ own description of how the afterlife is organized, it does not prevent us from saying that for Jesus himself, and/or for those who handed on the tradition, this story indicates, in standard Jewish style, a clear belief in continuity between the present life and the ‘resurrection’ strand in second-Temple Judaism, or with a ‘disembodied immortality’ stand; the possibility is envisaged that Lazarus might return from the dead, but Abraham forbids that it should happen. It does, however, highlight one of the many metaphors current in Judaism for the abode of the blessed, either in perpetuity or prior to their possible rising again: Lazarus has gone to ‘Abraham’s bosom’. Luke’s intention in placing the story here (soon after the ‘inaugurated eschatology’ of 15.24, 32, and soon before the apocalyptic warnings of 17.22-37) is at least clear: things done and decided in the present are to be seen in the light of the promised future. ‘Resurrection’ is coming forwards into the present in Jesus’ ministry, but those who cannot see it and reorder their lives accordingly are in danger of losing all. Significantly, this message of resurrection is clearly linked to the call for justice, which remains a closely related theme throughout early Christianity, This, we may suppose, was exactly the kind of thing that would put the average Sadducee right off the whole idea” (RSG, Wright 337–338).

Even John Lightfoot adds:

“[In the parable of Lazarus and the rich man] perhaps there may be something more aimed at in the name [Lazarus]: for since the discourse is concerning Abraham and Lazarus, who would not call to mind Abraham and Eliezer his servant, one born at Damascus, a Gentile by birth, and sometime in posse the heir of Abraham; but shut out of the inheritance by the birth of Isaac, yet restored here into Abraham’s bosom? Which I leave to the judgment of the reader, whether it might not hint the calling of the Gentiles into the faith of Abraham” (Lightfoot's commentary on Luke 16).

Lightfoot’s interpretation is in opposition to Andrew, who believes Lazarus does not specifically represent the Gentiles. Ernest L. Martin elaborates upon Lightfoot’s observation, pointing out the rich man’s five brothers, relating them with the five brothers of Judah.

In any case, the parable needs to be taken with a grain of salt. As Andrew Perriman has said, “[It] would certainly be unwise to draw firm theological conclusions from this one traditional story. It would be different if Jesus spoke repeatedly, using arguments from the Old Testament, about the conscious suffering of all the wicked in flames following death - but, of course, he didn’t” (opensourcetheology.net, “Lazarus and Dives”).

A New Testament Alternative

Though the New Testament is fairly silent on hades, there are four verses in particular that seemingly provide an alternative to the sheol of the Old Testament. Three of these verses are by Paul.

The first passage appears in the second epistle to the Corinthians, chapter five.

“So we are always of good courage. We know that while we are at home in the body we are away from the Lord, for we walk by faith, not by sight. Yes, we are of good courage, and we would rather be away from the body and at home with the Lord. So whether we are at home or away, we make it our aim to please him” (2Co 5:6–9).

Though Paul does not explicitly say being absent from the body yields God’s presence with his use of the Greek word kai, he is certainly willing to be both absent and present with the Lord; the implications of these statements seem to be apparent: when one is absent from the body, he is present with the Lord. However, closer view of the context makes interpretation of this passage more difficult. The first few verses are clearly talking about resurrection. Is Paul saying one enters God’s presence when he is absent from the body or that the believer is brought one step closer to resurrection when he dies? Would Paul, who just said, “not that we would be unclothed, but that we would be further clothed, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life”, really cling to the hope of leaving his body and entering an intermediate state? Perhaps not here, but elsewhere suggests he does.

The next passages of interest appear in the epistle to the Philippians.

“For to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain. If I am to live in the flesh, that means fruitful labor for me. Yet which I shall choose I cannot tell. I am hard pressed between the two. My desire is to depart and be with Christ, for that is far better” (Php 1:21–23).

Here, clearly, Paul expects to be with Christ after he dies. The language of departing is far less ambiguous than Paul’s statement to the Corinthians. How can this be harmonized with the other texts we have examined thus far, though? I leave it to the reader's judgment to draw a conclusion as to whether Paul contradicts the Old Testament (and sometimes New Testament) concepts we have thus far witnessed.

The next appears in the first epistle to the Thessalonians.

“For God has not destined us for wrath, but to obtain salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, who died for us so that whether we are awake or asleep we might live with him” (1Th 5:9–10).

Paul offers the reader hope that the believer lives together with Jesus whether awake or asleep (i.e. dead or alive). Again, I leave it to the reader to decide what exactly this means.

The next passage, more ambiguous than the other three by Paul, appears in the book of Revelation.

“When he opened the fifth seal, I saw under the altar the souls of those who had been slain for the word of God and for the witness they had borne. They cried out with a loud voice, ‘O Sovereign Lord, holy and true, how long before you will judge and avenge our blood on those who dwell on the earth?’” (Rev 6:9-10).

Founding an entire doctrine on this passage alone is lacking. John’s apocalypse is filled with highly symbolic and figurative language. Moreover, it seems John has something more specific in mind than the espousing of a doctrine of conscious existence after death.

First, these souls are seen under an altar. The word “altar” is translated from thusiasterion, meaning “a place of sacrifice.” The point of the saints’ plea, then, is to hyperbolically stress God’s peoples’ need of vengeance and vindication; they are being slain like lambs upon an altar, and their enemies are getting away with it.

Second, as noted above, the soul (in Greek, psyche) is thought of as being in the blood. Blood is sprinkled upon an altar during sacrifice.

Third, the passage seems to be indirectly linked with the martyrdom of Abel, who’s blood is depicted as crying out from the ground to God (Gen 4:10; cf. Mat 23:35).

Thus, the passage should not be taken too literally, no more than the account of Abel’s blood crying from the ground should be. This passage, after all, is contained within an apocalyptic context. Nevertheless, the passage relates the need for the suffering people of God to be vindicated.

The next passage, the most ambiguous of them all, appears in the gospel according to Luke. Jesus is dying on the cross, when the one thief hanging on a cross next to him asks a question.

“And he said, ‘Jesus, remember me when you come into your kingdom.’ And he [Jesus] said to him, ‘Truly, I say to you, today you will be with me in Paradise’” (Luk 23:42–43).

There are three problems with the popular interpretation of this passage.

The first has to do with the comma. The oldest Greek texts contain no punctuation. Thus, scholars sometimes infer punctuation into their translation. Most scholars put the comma after “to you” (soi). However, some have their doubts. Rotherham translates the verse, “And he said unto him—Verily, I say unto thee this day: With me, shalt thou be in Paradise.” The Concordant Literal Version does so similarly: “And Jesus said to him, ‘Verily, to you am I saying today, with Me shall you be in paradise.’”

Rotherham adds in a footnote:

“It is left for the reader to determine whether the words ‘this day’ should be joined (A) with the former part of the sentence, or (B) with the latter. In favour of (A) may be urged (1)the fact that semeron, ‘this day,’ does not always stand first in the clause to which it belongs(see Lu. ii. 11; v.26; xxii. 34; Ac. xx. 26; xii. 3; xxiv.21; xxvi.29; (2) that being essentially a demonstrative word, it will bear any reasonable stress which may be laid upon it, whether it be placed before or after the words it qualifies; (3) that it is far from meaningless if regarded as belonging to the opening words of asseveration (‘Thou dost ask to be remembered then: verily thou art assured now. As on this day of my weakness and shame, thou hast faith to ask, I this day have authority to answer’); (4) that the latter part of this verse is thus left free to refer to the very matter of the supplicant’s request (‘Thou dost ask to be remembered when I come in my kingdom: thou shalt be remembered then, and with distinguished favor: thou shalt be in my kingdom; shalt be with me in the very paradise of my kingdom, in the garden of the Lord — Is.li.3 [Sep. paradesios]; Eze.xxxvi.35; compare Ge.ii.8 [Sept. paradesios]; Re.ii.7 — in that most central and blessed part of the coming kingdom, of which thou dost believe me to be the destined king.’ On the other hand, in support of (B)it may be said, (1) that our Lord’s well known formula, ‘Verily I say to thee,‘ ‘Verily I say to thee,’ in every instance stands thus simply alone without any other qualifying word; (2) that the double emphasis produced by attaching ‘this day’ to the words coming after (‘This day, with me shalt thou be’) is exactly matched by chap. xix. 5(‘This day, in thine house I must needs abide’); (3) that no ingenuity of exposition can silence the testimony of Lu. xvi. 23, 25 to the conscious comfort of separate souls in Abraham’s bosom; (4) that in the days of our Lord, that state of waiting consolation was sometimes termed ‘paradise,’ to which state, therefore, the believing listener might not unnaturally understand the speaker to refer; and (5) that, although this interpretation does not regard the Lord’s reply as covering of the precise intention of the petitioner, it must nevertheless have been to him a pre-eminently satisfactory answer, no better pledge of a place in the future kingdom being conceivable than an immediate place in the paradise of waiting souls in the companionship of the anointed king. (For the various and not always consistent views of the Jews in the days of our Lord regarding ‘Paradise,’ see Smith’s Bible Dictionary, under that word: it was far off in the distant East, further than the foot of man had trod-it was a region in the world of the dead, of Sheol, in the heart of the earth-or, again, it was in the third heaven, etc, etc, -From this account it will be seen what weight should be attched to Jewish opinion in connection with what Jesus spoke of the rich man and Lazarus, Lu. xvi.)” (qtd. in “Where should the comma be placed?”).

E.W. Bullinger comments in The Companion Bible, Appendix 173:

“The interpretation of this verse depends entirely on punctuation, which rests wholly on human authority, the Greek manuscripts having no punctuation of any kind till the ninth century, and then it is only a dot (in the middle of the line) separating each word. …

The Verb ‘to say’, when followed by hoti, introduces the ipsissima verba of what is said; and answers to our quotation marks. So here (in Luke 23:43), in the absence of hoti = ‘that’, there may be a doubt as to the actual words included in the dependent clause. But the doubt is resolved (1) by the common Hebrew idiom, ‘I say unto thee this day’, which is constantly used for very solemn emphasis (See note on Deut. 4:26); as well as (2) by the usage observable in other passages where the verb is connected with the Gr. semeron = to-day.

1. With hoti : —

Mark 14:30 : ‘Verily I say unto thee, that (hoti) this day … thou shalt deny me thrice.’

Luke 4:21 : ‘And He began to say unto them, that (hoti) ‘This day is this scripture fulfilled in your ears.’’

Luke 5:26 : ‘Saying (hoti =that), ‘We have seen strange things to-day.’

Luke 19:9 : ‘Jesus said unto him that (hoti), this day is salvation come into this house.’

For other examples of the verb ‘to say’, followed by hoti, but not connected with semeron (to-day), see Matt. 14:26; 16:18; 21:3; 26:34; 27:47; Mark 1:40; 6:14, 15, 18, 35; 9:26; 14:25. Luke 4:24, 41; 15:27; 17:10; 19:7.

2. Without hoti : —

On the other hand, in the absence of hoti (= that), the relation of the word ‘to-day’ must be determined by the context.

Luke 22:34 : ‘And He said, ‘I tell thee, Peter, in no wise shall a cock crow to-day before thou shalt thrice deny that thou knowest Me.’ Here the word ‘to-day’ is connected with the verb ‘crow’, because the context requires it. Compare Heb. 4:7.

It is the same in Luke 23:43 : ‘And Jesus said to him, ‘Verily I say unto thee to-day [or this day (*1), when, though they were about to die, this man had expressed so great faith in Messiah’s coming Kingdom, and therefore in the Lord’s resurrection to be its King — now, under such solemn circumstances] thou shalt be, with Me, in Paradise.’ For when Messiah shall reign His Kingdom will convert the promised land into a Paradise. Read Isa. 35, and see Note on Ecc. 2:5” (Bullinger Appendix 173).

Bullinger draws to mind Deuteronomy 8:19 and 30:18 LXX.

“Kai [And] estai [it will be] ean [if] lethe [in forgetfulness] epilathe [you should forget] kuriou [the Lord]] ton theou sou [your God], kai [and] poreuthes [should go] opiso [after] theon eteron [other gods], kai [and] latreuses [should serve] autois [to them], kai [and] proskuneses autois [should do obeisance to them], diamarturomai [I testify] umin [to you] semeron [today] ton [on] te [both] ouranon [heaven] kai [and] ten [the] gen [earth] apoleia [by destruction] apoleiasthe [you shall be destroyed]” (The Apostolic Bible Polyglot, Deut 8:19 LXX).

“Anaggello [I announce] soi [ to you] semeron [today], hoti [that] apoleia [by destruction] apoleisthe [you will be destroyed” (The Apostolic Bible Polyglot, Deut 30:18 LXX).

Here we see that semeron is incorporated to add emphasis.

Additionally, Bruce Metzger notes in A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament:

“The Curetonian Syriac rearranges the order of words, joining σημερον, not with μετ’ εση but with ’Αμην σοι λεγω (‘Truly I say to you today, that with me you will be…’)” (qtd. in TheologyWeb).

The problem lies not just in translation, but also in interpretation. Paradeisos is the Greek word used to translate Eden and often refers to what is to happen on Earth, whether literally or metaphorically, rather than an intermediate state in-between death and resurrection.

Andrew Perriman comments:

“Jesus’ promise to the repentant criminal that ‘today you will be with me in Paradise’ (Luke 23:43) has usually been read as a statement about what happens after death. … The word, however, occurs in a highly suggestive context in Isaiah 51:3 LXX: ‘And now I will comfort you, O Zion; and I have comforted all her desert places; and I will make her desert places as a garden (paradeison) of the LORD.’ The wider passage speaks of the salvation of Zion following divine judgment and resonates at a number of points with the crucifixion narrative, not least:

The Lord God has opened my ear, and I was not rebellious; I turned not backward. I gave my back to those who strike, and my cheeks to those who pull out the beard; I hid not my face from disgrace and spitting. But the Lord God helps me; therefore I have not been disgrace; therefore I have set my face like a flint, and I know that I shall not be put to shame. He who vindicates me is near. (Isa. 50:5–8).

Arguably the real promise here has to do less with the fate of the individual than with the restoration of Israel – not through violence (all the more pertinent if the ‘criminal’ is not a petty thief but a revolutionary who sought the liberation of Israel through armed resistance) but through the suffering of the Servant of the Lord and through national repentance. ‘Paradise’ is then not so much a place to which the soul goes at death, temporarily or otherwise, but a metaphor for the salvation of Israel which is to be accomplished through Jesus’ death and resurrection. The promise is an assurance to those who ‘pursue righteousness’ (Isa. 51:1) that the God who made Abraham many (51:2) will indeed comfort Zion and transform her wilderness into a garden like Eden” (COSM, Perriman 87).

Wright, on the other hand, takes the stance that Jesus is referring to an intermediate state (RSG page 438, footnote 114). His opinion seems to be backed up by Paul, who equates paradeisos with the “third heaven” (2Co 12:4).

I think close attention is due to the thief’s actual request. The thief wants Jesus to remember him when he comes in his Kingdom. Should we interpret this as a first century Pharisee probably would, to refer to the Kingdom of the age to come (ha`olam ha-ba), that is, the post-resurrection renewed creation, or, rather, to the Kingdom the Son of Man figure of Daniel receives upon ascension to the Ancient of Days (Dan 7:13-14), a foreshadow and even inauguration of the former? Either interpretation rules out that it happened on the very day the thief asked, but the latter interpretation suggests the thief shared in Jesus’ vindication on the third day. Was he perhaps one of those who came out of his grave on Jesus’ resurrection (Mat 27:52)? If so, did he ascend also with Jesus to receive the Kingdom? Perhaps we should interpret this passage less literally to refer to covenant renewal, the foreshadowing of new creation (paradise on Earth).

The final problem of the popular interpretation has to do with the same author’s other statement that Jesus was in hades prior to resurrection (Act 2:31). If paradise is an intermediate state, is it in hades?

In my opinion, the passage is so ambiguous that a solid conclusion cannot be drawn.

The Harrowing of Hell

Those who believe in a conscious intermediate state of torment for the wicked often believe Jesus descended into this place to deliver the Old Covenant saints to Heaven. This have come to be called the harrowing of Hell. However, it has very, very little support.

One of the most commonly quoted passages is contained in the following:

“Christ also suffered once for sins, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh but made alive in the spirit, in which he went and proclaimed to the spirits in prison, because they formerly did not obey, when God’s patience waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was being prepared, in which a few, that is, eight persons, were brought safely through water” (1Pe 3:18-20).

This verse is very ambiguous. Who are these spirits in prison? Apparently they are only those who sinned in the days of Noah. This calls to mind the 1 Enoch tradition of the sinning angels. Both the author of the second epistle of Peter and the author of the epistle of Jude seem to uphold this tradition (cf. 2Pe 2:4; Jud 1:6). If this interpretation is correct, it would mean that through Jesus’ resurrection he subjected “angels, authorities, and powers” (v. 22), even fallen angels (if they actually exist). However, other interpretations are welcome, but I find the previous to be the most likely.

Conclusion

Based on my above studies, I think the hope for postmortem existence is small. The passages that offer this hope are extremely marginal. In contrast to these few passages, there are many that suggest the opposite. Moreover, even if the believer enters a conscious intermediate state of bliss, there is basically no evidence that the unbeliever enters a conscious state of torment. I find little evidence that death changed with Jesus’ resurrection (i.e. harrowing of Hell), so if there is a conscious intermediate state, there always was. What conclusion have I reached myself?

I now remain agnostic on the nature of the intermediate state. I must admit Paul believed in conscious existence after death from my objective study, but Paul meets contradictions practically everywhere else. It seems there was a definite development in Judaism about the intermediate state as Jews came into contact with Hellenism (cf. the Apocrypha et al.). With that said, the reader has a choice as to whether he wants to believe as the early Jews did, or as the later Jews did, including Paul. I prefer to believe as the early Jews did.

For the reader, considering the intermediate state is largely unimportant, resurrection is the ultimate goal, and there is marginal evidence for life after death, I think it is best that we make no mention of it all, letting each individual decide what he believes for himself.

My new blog

2007-11-15T00:31:00.000-08:00

I have been composing some essays for opensourcetheology.net to provoke discussions, but I decided that the essays are worth saving, organizing, and in the future, revising. I realized I should create a blog to archive these essays. I will also add less detailed posts from time to time about Christianity, theology, or whatever catches my interest.

In case you are wondering, I am an 18-year old non-denominational Christian dedicated to studying the Scriptures. My goal is to have part in many different churches (even if I disagree with what some teach), eventually have a role in biblical scholarship (after college, of course), and perhaps missionary work (but not full-time).

Currently I am attending a small charismatic church, a Methodist church, and a Calvary Chapel. I plan to attend other churches in the future.

I am a big fan of Andrew Perriman and N.T. Wright, who have been extremely influential to me both theologically and historically; I am familiarizing myself with Brian Mclaren as well. There are many other interesting scholars out there I need to start reading, though. I plan to check out James Dunn and Krister Stendahl next, though there are plenty of other books by N.T. Wright I still need to read.

My first essay will be on life after death and the intermediate state. I will post it soon.